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Abstract
We introduce a simple generalization of Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s
epistemic entrenchment called partial entrenchment. We show that pref-
erential inference can be generated as the sceptical counterpart of an in-
ference mechanism defined directly on partial entrenchment.
1 Introduction
Preference is an important concept in knowledge representation. Whenever we
aim to design a framework that does not depend solely on logical considerations,
a possible way to incorporate extralogical information is to treat it as preference.
Preference is subjective. Yet, preference is not based on a beyond analysis
personal taste. If that was the case, it would have been pointless to seek a logic
for preference.
Preference is based on available information, both implicit (facts we learned
and believed) and explicit (facts we empirically verified). In many cases, we
can assume that two persons who were exposed to similar information have the
same preferences. If their preferences diverge, we look for a difference on their
background knowledge and motives. What constitutes a basis of preference is
beyond the scope of this paper but labeling on the basis of criteria as the above
gives preference a social dimension, which in turns makes preference a basis of
reasoning.
What is the logic of preference? A simple but crucial first step has been made
by Shoham ([22],[23]) with the introduction of preferential models. Preferential
models are models equipped with a (non-reflexive, transitive) preference order-
ing. Models of this sort are not, strictly speaking, new as they can be reduced to
Kripke models or some other labeled order or relation. What is original about
them is the nature of the preference relation. This relation seeks to maximize
some function. To make this point clearer, let us suppose we have some box
emitting binary streams, it has emitted 000 until now, and we want to order
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two binary streams 0000 and 0001 according to our preference for its future be-
havior. Our first impulse would be to rank them equally, as both are possible.
This is what we would do if we knew nothing about the box. However, some
background information might make us choose one over the other, for example
0000. In both cases, (conditional) probability would prevail. On the other hand,
if some profit is to be made by choosing the less probable 0001 then again our
ordering would be a biased one. This preference would seek to maximize utility.
The above discussion points implicitly to conditional information and there-
fore to nonmonotonic inference defined through preferential models. Indeed,
what Shoham did is, by fixing a preferential model, to define: α preferentially
entails β iff β holds on all minimal models of α under the preference relation.
Preferential entailment is nonmonotonic as minimal models of α ∧ γ might dif-
fer from those of α. The preferential model approach to nonmonotonicity is a
semantical oasis in the overridden world of syntactic nonmonotonic formalisms.
It should be pointed out, however, that preferential models have their roots in
McCarthy’s Circumscription ([18]) as the latter is a syntactic formalism of se-
lecting the minimal models in a relation that prefers predicates with a smaller
extension.
The second important step was made by subsequent work of Kraus, Lehmann,
and Magidor ([11]) when they showed that preferential entailment on mod-
els whose preferential relation satisfies the additional second order property of
smoothness or stopperedness is characterized by the the system P (see Table 1),
where α∼ β means α preferentially entails β. This result made a connection
between the preferential model approach and work on (sceptical) nonmonotonic
consequence operators introduced by Gabbay ([6]) and studied by Makinson
([16]). System P is a simple yet powerful sequent-like consequence relation that
has been recognized ([11],[17]) as the strongest basis for nonmonotonic inference.
Any system stronger than P is bound to be non-Horn and therefore loose some
of its proof-theoretic content. However, apart from greatly diverging from the
theory of (monotonic) logical consequence, preferential entailment has the ad-
ditional defect of the inability of expressing credulous nonmonotonic inference,
that is, to express extensions.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a binary relation among sentences,
called partial entrenchment , that has the feature of being monotonic and ex-
press extensions and show that any class satisfying system P can be generated
as the intersection of those extensions. The subclass of partial entrenchments
consisting of total preorders is Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s expectation order-
ings which characterize expectation inference ([8]) and Lehmann and Magidor’s
rational inference ([12]). Restricting the class of expectation orderings with
properties parameterized by theories one gets epistemic entrenchment , a well
known class of linear preorders of sentences characterizing the AGM postulates
for belief revision ([1]). A further generalization of partial entrenchment led to
a uniform characterization of all nonmonotonic inference relations ([10]).
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we shall introduce par-
tial entrenchment, explain its function and compare its features with other ap-
proaches. In Section 3, we define a nonmonotonic consequence relation based
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Table 1: System P
α ⊢ β
α∼ β
(Supraclassicality)
α ⊢ β β ⊢ γ α∼ γ
β ∼ γ
(Left Logical Equivalence)
α∼ β β ⊢ γ
α∼ γ
(Right Weakening)
α∼ β α∼ γ
α∼ β ∧ γ
(And)
α∼ β α ∧ β ∼ γ
α∼ γ
(Cut)
α∼ β α∼ γ
α ∧ β ∼ γ
(Cautious Monotonicity)
α∼ γ β ∼ γ
α ∨ β ∼ γ
(Or)
α ∨ β ∼ α β ∨ γ ∼ β
α ∨ γ ∼ α
(Weak Transitivity)
on partial entrenchment called maxiconsistent inference and prove some of its
properties. Maxiconsistent consequence satisfies the properties of system P and,
in Section 4, we show that once we restrict the class of partial entrenchment to
an appropriate subclass we get a bijective correspondence.
2 Partial Entrenchment
In this paper, we will not give a semantic account of entrenchment relations
but a procedural one. We will now proceed with the formal definition of par-
tial entrenchment. We will use a propositional language of atomic variables,
denoted by Greek lower case letters α, β, γ, etc., and closed under the usual
propositional connectives ¬ (negation), ∨ (disjunction), ∧ (conjunction), and
→ (implication). Entrenchment relations assume an underlying logic. We will
use classical propositional consequence denoted with ⊢. Such a choice is almost
dictated by the choice of connectives and the theory we will develop but, in
addition, our intention is to build non-classical reasoning on top of a classical
one. This has the advantage of making our choices simpler and clearer. The set
of consequences of a set of sentences X under ⊢, will be denoted by Cn(X) and
we will write Cn(α) and Cn(X,α) for Cn({α}) and Cn(X, {α}), respectively.
Definition 1 A binary relation ≤ on L is called a partial entrenchment when
it satisfies the following properties:
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1. if α ≤ β and β ≤ γ, then α ≤ γ, (Transitivity)
2. if α ⊢ β, then α ≤ β, and (Dominance)
3. if γ ≤ α and γ ≤ β then γ ≤ α ∧ β. (Conjunction)
We write α < β for α ≤ β but β 6≤ α.
Partial entrenchment relations can be read as rules for extending theories.
The meaning of α ≤ β, where ≤ denotes the partial entrenchment is:
α can extend our theory provided we first extend it with β.
So entrenchment encodes constraints on theory extensions. Therefore, entrench-
ment is a priority mechanism for building extensions: we shall consider only
extensions that satisfy the entrenchment rules. The larger the extension the
better. The reader can easily verify that our reading of partial entrenchment
satisfies the above properties.
Partial entrenchment can also be expressed as a consequence relation that
extends classical logic. The main point here is that partial entrenchment re-
spects neither disjunction nor negation.
We shall now describe informally how entrenchment gives rise to a nonmono-
tonic consequence relation, i.e., a conditional of the form α∼ β. This paper is
taking a different approach on entrenchment by defining inference directly on an
entrenchment preorder. Here, the entrenchment relation becomes the primary
basic notion and nonmonotonic inference takes a secondary higher-order place
much like any consequence relation given some underlying proof theoretic mech-
anism. Entrenchment is not a proof mechanism as it lacks truth functionality
but is essentially a priority preorder encoding our preferences. Inference can be
roughly described as follows:
In order to evaluate a conditional α∼ β drop all sentences that could
imply ¬α. What remains are the sentences compatible with α. Form
all maximal consistent subsets and consider their intersection. Then
α∼ β holds if α together with this set implies β.
Similar proposals for evaluating conditionals have a long history in the philo-
sophical logic literature going back to Lewis ([14]) (see [4] for a relevant discus-
sion). Entrenchment is the mechanism for keeping track of this compatibility
relation. A sentence is compatible with α (we use coherent in Definition 3) if
it is not less than ¬α. This is also the main idea of Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson.
The novelty of our work is that we consider partial preorders and show that
the same way of evaluating conditionals still applies, giving rise to preferential
inference. As partial preorders give a multitude of possible maximal compatible
sets we consider their intersection, that is a ’sceptical’ sort of inference.
Consider the following simple example. In Figure 1, a path upwards from
α to β indicates that α ≤ β, where ≤ denotes the entrenchment relation. The
partial entrenchment of Figure 1 says, for example, that ⊥ is less entrenched
than all formulas, f is less entrenched than ¬p, b → f and f → b, while f → b
is less entrenched than p→ b, p→ ¬f and ⊤.
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Figure 1: A (transitive) entrenchment relation.
For instance, let us assume p and suppose we want to extend the classi-
cal theory of p, Cn(p) to a consistent theory. We can add any sentence to it,
provided we do not add ¬p or any sentence implying ¬p. However, our en-
trenchment example says that apart from ¬p and any sentence implying ¬p we
should exclude any sentence less than ¬p in the entrenchment relation. We shall
see that the definition of entrenchment will ensure us that ¬p and all sentences
stronger than ¬p are less than ¬p in the entrenchment relation. So we can use
the entrenchment relation alone and exclude all sentences less than ¬p. So we
are left with {p → b, p → ¬f, f → b}. We can add those to Cn(p) to form the
extension Cn(p, b,¬f).
Now, let us assume nothing but true sentences and see how we can extend
Cn(∅). As before, we should only exclude formulas less or equal to ⊥. In this
case, we cannot consider together all sentences that are not less or equal to ⊥,
because this set of sentences is inconsistent. However, we can choose consistent
subsets from this set. We must only take care that such sets are upper closed so
that they obey the entrenchment relation constraints. Further, we want to add
as many sentences as possible so these sets must be maximal. There are two
such upper-closed maximal consistent sets of sentences: one contains ¬b and
f → b and the other f and f → b. Adding those to Cn(∅), we can form two
extensions: Cn(¬b,¬f,¬p) and Cn(b, f,¬p). Therefore, it is possible to have
more than one alternative for extending the theory of our assumptions leading
to the well-known phenomenon of multiple extensions.
Considering non-truth functional orderings of sentences while respecting con-
junction is rather an old idea, going back to Schackle ([20]), and used in different
disguises in works of Levi ([13]), Cohen ([2]), Shafer ([21]), Zadeh ([25]), Spohn
([24]), and Dubois and Prade ([3]). The above authors use an ordering of sen-
tences satisfying the partial entrenchment properties. However, they impose an
5
additional constraint:
for all α, β ∈ L, either α ≤ β or β ≤ α. (Connectivity)
A partial entrenchment satisfying connectivity will be called connected. The
important contribution of Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson was to show that such
connected preorders characterize exactly (not only define) expectation infer-
ence. Subsequently, the author showed that these orderings characterize also
Lehmann and Magidor’s rational inference in [9]. The main contribution of this
paper is showing that dropping the connectivity condition, the resulting class
of orderings, that is, the class of partial entrenchment defined above, gives rise
to preferential inference as a sceptical form of nonmonotonic inference.
Lindstro¨m and Rabinowicz ([15]) were the first to propose dropping connec-
tivity from the Ga¨rdenfors-Makinson connected entrenchment. Their epistemic
entrenchment orderings form a subclass of partial entrenchment by satisfying
additional postulates related to a fixed theory and were used for describing a
relational belief revision system. Their approach is slightly different to ours as
they require an overall consistent entrenchment. However, a common central
idea of both approaches is that such relations point to more than one extension.
The linear preorder that Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson introduced by the name
of epistemic entrenchment had apart from connectivity two other important
features: Transitivity and Dominance. Transitivity shows that we deal with a
simple notion of transitive preference while Dominance shows that more specific
sentences should be prefered over more general ones. These properties are the
basic characteristics of entrenchment and form also a part of the definition of
partial entrenchment.
There are at least two other previous attempts of characterizing nonmono-
tonic inference through some ordering of sentences. These are Michael Freund’s
preferential orderings ([5]) and Hans Rott’s generalized epistemic entrenchments
([19]). Both have a similar approach giving a correspondence with nonmono-
tonic consequence relations1. Both build on a syntactic condition that translates
rational consequence relations to preorders. Hans Rott is using the Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson condition on belief contractions while Freund is using the Kraus,
Lehman and Magidor condition (α ≤ β iff α∼ α ∨ ¬β). In order to gener-
ate a preferential inference relation they consider a translation of a connected
entrenchment: Freund is using the contrapositive (page 236 in [5]) and Rott
the complement of the inverse. Then they relax properties of the translated
entrenchment. However this approach leads to preorders that if, they are trans-
lated back to entrenchment would fail either Dominance in Freund’s case (prop-
erty P1, page 237 in [5]) or Transitivity in Rott’s case (SEE1, page 52 in [19]).
This loss of these properties is not however the main difference between the
work presented here and those proposals. Those proposals insist on generating
consequence relation in a deterministic way given a preferential ordering. In
a partial setting, preference gives rise to more than one alternative, that is.
1Strictly speaking, Rott is characterizing weaker than rational non-Horn belief contraction
systems.
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a multitude of most preferred possible situations and the process of inferring
statements becomes nondeterministic.
3 Maxiconsistent Inference
We shall now proceed in describing nonmonotonic inference through partial
entrenchment. In defining inference, we shall make heavy use of negation, or
better, of consistency. This is a very important point often overlooked by previ-
ous works on entrenchment. This is the only place where entrenchment makes
effective use of the underlying logic, in our case, classical logic. Inference, as
illustrated in the above example, consists of two steps. First, we exclude all sen-
tences less than the negation of our assumption. Second, we choose maximal,
upper-closed, consistent, deductively closed sets of sentences that form our ex-
tensions. Adding to those extensions the classical theory of our assumptions and
closing under intersection yields the nonmonotonic theory of our assumptions.
This procedure only makes sense for a finite set of assumptions, as negation
plays a central role in its definition, so the resulting nonmonotonic consequence
relation is a subset of L × L.
A partial entrenchment relation is clearly a partial preorder. A subset F of
L will be called upper-closed iff α ∈ F and α ≤ β implies β ∈ F . A subset F
of L will be called closed under conjunction iff α, β ∈ F implies α ∧ β ∈ F . An
upper-closed, closed under conjunction, proper subset F of L, is a filter . A filter
F of the partial entrenchment is also a filter of the Boolean-Lindenbaum algebra
of ⊢ and, therefore, deductively closed, that is, Cn(F ) = F . The converse is not
true. A deductively closed F set might fail to be a partial entrenchment filter.
However, the upper-closure ↑F of F is the least filter containing F . This fact is
a consequence of Dominance and Conjunction. Principal upper closed sets are
filters and deductively closed, that is, ↑α = Cn(α).
Given a partial entrenchment, we shall denote its set of filters with F . The
space 〈F ,⊆〉 is itself a complete semilattice with intersection as meet. It has also
directed joins because if two filters are included in a third then the intersection
of all filters containing their union is again a filter. This kind of partial order is
often called a dcpo.
Definition 2 Let ≤ be a partial entrenchment. The set of coherent sentences
for a sentence α ∈ L is the set
Coh(α) = {β | β 6≤ ¬α}.
The base of α is the set
F(α) = {F | F ∈ F , F ⊆ Coh(a)}.
The maximal base of α is the set
Fmax(α) = {F | F ∈ F(α), and if F
′ ∈ F(α) with F ⊆ F ′ then F = F ′}.
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The extension set of α is the set
e(α) = {Cn(F, α) | F ∈ Fmax(α)}.
The sceptical extension of α is the set
E(α) =
⋂
e(α),
and now define
α∼≤ β iff β ∈ E(α),
and say that α maxiconsistently infers β in the partial entrenchment ≤. 2
Note that
F ∈ F(α) iff ¬α 6∈ F iff ¬α 6∈ Cn(F ).
Unless ≤ equals L × L, i.e. the inconsistent ordering, F is non-empty. As a
corollary of Zorn’s lemma, every filter not containing ¬α is included in an ele-
ment of Fmax(α). Therefore, if F(α) is non-empty then Fmax(α) is non-empty.
On the other hand, F(α) can be empty, even though ≤ is not inconsistent. This
can only happen if β ≤ ¬α, for all β ∈ L. In this case, we have that α∼ ⊥. In
fact we have the following
e(α) = ∅ iff
⋂
e(α) = L iff α∼ ⊥ iff ⊤ ≤ ¬α.
The following properties of bases will be useful in the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 3 For all α, β ∈ L we have:
1. if α ⊢ β then F(α) ⊆ F(β),
2. F(α ∨ β) = F(α) ∪ F(β),
3. Fmax(α∨β) = (Fmax(α)∩Fmax(β))∪ (Fmax(α)\F(β))∪ (Fmax(β)\F(α)),
4. F(α ∧ β) ⊆ F(α) ∩ F(β),
5. if α ∼ β then F(α) = F(α ∧ β),
6. α 6∼ β if and only if Fmax(α) ∩ Fmax(α ∧ β) 6= ∅.
Proof. We have ¬β ⊢ ¬α which implies ¬β ≤ ¬α. This shows that if F is a
filter and ¬α 6∈ F then ¬β 6∈ F and we conclude Part (1).
For the right to left direction of Part (2), use Part (1) to show that F(α) ∪
F(β) ⊆ F(α∨β). For the other direction, observe that if ¬α∧¬β 6∈ F then either
¬α 6∈ F or ¬β 6∈ F , since F is closed under conjunctions. Hence F ∈ F(α)∪F(β)
and we conclude Part (2).
For the left to right inclusion of Part (3), assume F ∈ Fmax(α∨β). Observe
that F ∈ F(α) implies F ∈ Fmax(α), else there exists F ′ ∈ Fmax(α) such that
2Filters have been employed by Lindstro¨m and Rabinowicz for defining multiple revision
outcomes. In [15], our F(α) and Fmax(α) are called fallbacks and maximal fallbacks of α.
8
F ⊆ F ′ and F 6= F ′. We have F ′ 6∈ Fmax(α ∨ β), since F ∈ Fmax(α ∨ β). So
F ′ 6∈ F(α), by Part 1, a contradiction.
For the other inclusion, assume
F ∈ (Fmax(α) ∩ Fmax(β)) ∪ (Fmax(α)\F(β)) ∪ (Fmax(β)\F(α)).
Let F ′ ∈ F(α∨β) with F ⊆ F ′. We have either F ′ ∈ Fmax(α) or F ′ ∈ Fmax(β),
by Part (2). In the first case, we have F ∈ F(α), as F(α) is lower-closed, and this
can only happen if F ∈ (Fmax(α)∩Fmax(β))∪(Fmax(α)\F(β)). So F ∈ Fmax(α)
and F = F ′. The other case is similar and, therefore, F ∈ Fmax(α ∨ β).
Part (4) is a straightforward corollary of Part (1).
Now, we turn to Part (5). By Part (4), we have F(α ∧ β) ⊆ F(α). If
F(α) = ∅, we are done. Suppose that F(α) 6= ∅, and let F ∈ F(α). Further, let
F ′ ∈ Fmax(α) such that F ⊆ F ′. By our hypothesis, we have F ′, α ⊢ β. Also,
we have α→ ¬β 6∈ F ′, since otherwise ¬α ∈ F ′. Therefore ¬α∨¬β 6∈ F . Hence
F ∈ F(α ∧ β).
For Part 6, suppose that α 6∼ β then there exists F ∈ Fmax(α) such that
¬α ∨ β 6∈ F . Therefore, F ∈ F(α ∧ β) and, since F(α ∧ β) ⊆ F(α), F ∈
Fmax(α ∧ β). The other direction is similar.
It is worth noting that from the algebra of sentences we moved to the algebra
of theories and onto the algebra of the powerset of theories. The last algebra is
of considerable interest as is the algebra pertaining to nonmonotonic inference.
For example, we could dispense with maximal filters and study directly the
lattice of the powerset of F . Our intention, however, is to introduce as little
theory overhead as possible.
We now have everything we need for characterizing preferential inference.
However, we should first verify our claim that maxiconsistent inference is a
preferential one.
Theorem 4 Given a partial entrenchment ≤, the consequence relation ∼≤
satisfies the system P rules.
Proof. We verify the following list of rules: Supraclassicality, Left Logical Equiv-
alence, Right Weakening, And, Cut, Cautious Monotony, and Or. 3
For Supraclassicality, suppose that α ⊢ γ then F, α ⊢ γ, for all F ∈ Fmax(α).
For Left Logical Equivalence, suppose that α ⊢ β and β ⊢ α. By Lemma 3(1)
we have that Fmax(α) = Fmax(β). So, for every filter F ∈ Fmax(α) = Fmax(β),
if F, α ⊢ γ then F, β ⊢ γ.
For And, suppose that F, α ⊢ β and F, α ⊢ γ, for all F ∈ Fmax(α). Then
F, α ⊢ β ∧ γ.
For Right Weakening, Suppose that for all F ∈ Fmax(α) we have F, α ⊢ β
and β ⊢ γ. Then by (classical) Cut we get F, α ⊢ γ.
For Cut, suppose that α∼ β and α∧β ∼ γ. Suppose that F ∈ Fmax(α) then
F, a ⊢ β. By Lemma 3(5), we have Fmax(α∧β) and, therefore, F, α∧β ⊢ γ. By
(classical) Cut, we have F, α ⊢ γ. Hence α∼ γ.
3Cut is redundant, see [11].
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For Cautious Monotony, suppose that α∼ β and α∼ γ, and let F ∈ Fmax(α∧
β). By Lemma 3(5), we have F ∈ Fmax(α). Thus F, α ⊢ γ, and therefore
F, α ∧ β ⊢ γ. Hence α ∧ β ∼ γ.
For Or, suppose that α∼ γ and β ∼ γ, and let F ∈ Fmax(α ∨ β). By
Lemma 3(4), there are three cases to consider: either (i) F ∈ Fmax(α)∩Fmax(β),
or (ii) F ∈ Fmax(α) with F 6∈ F(β), or (iii) F ∈ Fmax(β) with F 6∈ F(α). In
case (i), we have F, α ⊢ γ and F, β ⊢ γ, so F, α ∨ β ⊢ γ. In case (ii), we have
F, β ⊢ ⊥, and therefore F, β ⊢ γ. Again F, α ∨ β ⊢ γ, as above. Case (iii) is
similar.
Given the above results we can now give a simple translation of the property
of Rational Monotonicity.
Corollary 5 Let ≤ be a partial entrenchment. Then ∼≤ satisfies
α 6∼≤ ¬β α∼≤ γ
α ∧ β∼≤ γ
(Rational Monotonicity)
if and only if
Fmax(α) ∩ Fmax(α ∧ β) 6= ∅ and α→ γ ∈
⋂
Fmax(α) implies
α ∧ β → γ ∈
⋂
Fmax(α ∧ β).
Proof. It is immediate by the definition of maxiconsistent inference and Lemma
3.6.
A very natural subclass of partial entrenchments is the original class of con-
nected entrenchments introduced by Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson ([7],[8]). This
class was shown to be equivalent to the class of rational nonmonotonic conse-
quence relations ([9]) under the following translation:
a∼GMβ iff either β ≤ ¬α, for all β ∈ L,
or there is a β ∈ L such that {β | α < β} ⊢ α→ γ.
It is easy to see, by Definition 3, that the above way through which a con-
nected entrenchment gives rise to a nonmonotonic consequence relation is a spe-
cial instance of the definition of maxiconsistent inference, that is, ∼≤ = ∼GM .
Now we can give an alternative proof of the fact that connected entrenchments
give rise to rational nonmonotonic consequence relations by showing that a con-
nected entrenchment satisfies the property of Lemma 5. In fact, it satisfies a
much stronger property as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 6 If ≤ is a connected entrenchment then
Fmax(α) ∩ Fmax(α ∧ β) 6= ∅ implies Fmax(α ∧ β) ⊆ Fmax(α).
Proof. This is immediate because if ≤ is connected then Fmax(α) is either a
singleton or empty for all α ∈ L.
10
Corollary 7 ([8],[9]) If ≤ is a connected entrenchment then ∼≤ is a rational
inference relation.
In the next section we shall exhibit a class of non-connected entrenchment
relations that satisfy the property of Lemma 5, and therefore give rise to rational
inference relations. We leave open the question whether there is a simple first-
order property of ≤ that relaxes connectivity and still implies the property
of Lemma 5. The above corollary shows why maxiconsistent inference makes
partial entrenchment a generalization of the Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson original
notion of entrenchment. It is well known that connected entrenchments not
only give rise to rational inference but they are in bijective correspondence as
well. Given a rational inference relation ∼ one can construct a connected
entrenchment ≤ with ∼ = ∼≤ using the translation below
α ≤ β iff either ⊢ α ∧ β or ¬(α ∧ β) 6∼ α,
proposed in [9] which is a slightly modified version of the one proposed by
Ga¨rdenfors-Makinson for expectation inference relations (see [8]). In the case
of partial entrenchment relations the above translation no longer works. In the
next section, an alternative way to generate entrenchment given a preferential
inference relation will be presented.
4 Reducing Preferential Inference to Partial En-
trenchment
In this section, we show that every preferential consequence relation can be ex-
pressed as a maxiconsistent inference of a partial entrenchment. The class of
maxiconsistent inference relations is much wider than that of preferential infer-
ence. Maxiconsistent inference expresses sceptical nonmonotonic consequence
by an intersection of possible extensions. Therefore, we can construct two dif-
ferent partial entrenchments assigning different sets of extensions for the same
assumptions while still agreeing on the intersection of the extensions.
Given a preferential inference relation, we will construct a partial entrench-
ment with the same maxiconsistent inference. This construction will be canoni-
cal, in the sense that one can safely identify a preferential inference relation with
the partial entrenchment constructed. The main idea is to construct a partial
entrenchment with all possible extensions of the sceptical extension. This way
their intersection will also provide the sceptical extension. It turns out that
such partial entrenchments can be described syntactically by adding the follow-
ing rule to Dominance, Transitivity, and Conjunction. For all α, β, γ ∈ L
if α → β ≤ ¬α and α → γ ≤ ¬α then α → (β ∨ γ) ≤ ¬α. (Weak
Disjunction)
A partial entrenchment satisfying Weak Disjunction is called weakly disjunctive.
The class of weakly disjunctive partial entrenchment is properly contained in
that of partial entrenchments as the following simple counterexample shows.
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Example 8 Let D = {φ, φ ∨ ψ ∨ χ}, and define an ordering as follows
α ≤ β iff B ⊢ α implies B ⊢ β, for all B ⊆ D.
The preorder ≤ is a partial entrenchment. However, it is not weakly disjunctive,
for φ ∨ ψ ≤ φ and φ ∨ χ ≤ φ but φ ∨ ψ ∨ χ ≤ φ.
The main property of weakly disjunctive partial entrenchments is given in
the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Let ≤ be a weak disjunctive partial entrenchment. Then for all
α ∈ L and F ∈ Fmax(α), either α→ β ∈ F or α→ ¬β ∈ F .
Proof. Fix an α ∈ L and F ∈ Fmax(α) and suppose α→ β 6∈ F and α→ ¬β 6∈
F , towards a contradiction. As F is maximal in Fmax(α), we have ¬α ∈↑ (F ∪
{α→ β}). This implies that there exists ǫ1 ∈ F such that ǫ1 ∧ (α → β) ≤ ¬α.
Similarly, there exists ǫ2 ∈ F such that ǫ2∧(α→ ¬β) ≤ ¬α. For ǫ = ǫ1∧ǫ2 ∈ F
we have both ǫ ∧ (α → β) ≤ ¬α and ǫ ∧ (α → ¬β) ≤ ¬α. Now observe that
(ǫ ∧ ¬α) ∨ (ǫ ∧ (α→ β)) is classically equivalent to ǫ ∧ (α→ β). So
(ǫ ∧ ¬α) ∨ (ǫ ∧ (α→ β)) ≤ ¬α.
Also, we have
(ǫ ∧ ¬α) ∨ (ǫ ∧ (α→ β)) ≤ ǫ.
So, by Conjunction,
(ǫ ∧ ¬α) ∨ (ǫ ∧ (α→ β)) ≤ ǫ ∧ ¬α.
Similarly,
(ǫ ∧ ¬α) ∨ (ǫ ∧ (α→ ¬β)) ≤ ǫ ∧ ¬α.
Applying Weak Disjunction on the last two, we have
(ǫ ∧ ¬α) ∨ (ǫ ∧ α ∧ ¬β) ∨ (ǫ ∧ (α→ β)) ≤ ǫ ∧ ¬α.
Therefore
(ǫ ∧ ¬α) ∨ ǫ ≤ ǫ ∧ ¬α.
Since ǫ ⊢ (ǫ ∧ ¬α) ∨ ǫ, we have
ǫ ≤ ((ǫ ∧ ¬α) ∨ ǫ) ≤ ǫ ∧ ¬α ≤ ¬α,
a contradiction as ǫ ∈ F ∈ Fmax(α).
Corollary 10 Let ≤ be a weak disjunctive partial entrenchment. Then
α→ ¬β ≤ ¬α iff α∼≤ β.
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Proof. For the right to left direction, assume α∼≤ β and α → ¬β 6≤ ¬α. We
have that α → β ∈ F , for all F ∈ Fmax(α), and α → ¬β ∈ Coh(α). We have
Cn(α → ¬β) ⊆ Coh(α). Choose F ∈ Fmax(α) such that Cn(α → ¬β) ⊆ F .
However, F contains α → β and therefore ¬α ∈ F , a contradiction. Note that
this direction does not use Weak Disjunction.
For the left to right direction, assume ¬α∨¬β ≤ ¬α. We must show α∼≤ β.
Let F ∈ Fmax(α). By Proposition 9, We have either α→ β ∈ F or α→ ¬β ∈ F .
We cannot have α→ ¬β ∈ F as α→ ¬β ≤ ¬α so α→ β ∈ F .
We can go back and forth between a preferential inference relation and a
partial entrenchment through a syntactic translation given in the following def-
inition.
Definition 11 Given a partial entrenchment ≤ and a nonmonotonic conse-
quence relation ∼ , then define a consequence relation ∼ ′ and a relation ≤′ as
follows
(N) α∼ ′β iff ¬α ∨ ¬β ≤ ¬α
(P ) α ≤′ β iff ¬α ∨ ¬β ∼ ¬α.
We shall denote ∼ ′ and ≤′ with N(≤) and P (∼ ), respectively.
Definition P is akin to a preorder defined in [11] by α ∨ β ∼ α (see also
Makinson’s comments in [17], page 78). The maps defined in Definition 4 are
inverses of each other.
Lemma 12 Let ≤ and ∼ be a partial entrenchment and a preferential infer-
ence relation, respectively. Then
1. P (N(≤)) =≤, and
2. N(P ( ∼ )) = ∼ .
Proof. Let ≤′= P (N(≤)). We have α ≤′ β iff ¬α∨¬β ∼ ¬α, where ∼ = N(≤).
Now, we have ¬α∨¬β ∼ ¬α iff ¬(¬α∨¬β)∨¬¬α ≤ ¬(¬α∨¬β), by definition.
The latter holds iff (α ∧ β) ∨ α ≤ α ∧ β iff α ≤ α ∧ β , by Dominance. Now,
α ≤ α ∧ β implies α ≤ β, by Transitivity, and α ≤ β implies α ≤ α ∧ β, by
Conjunction and Dominance.
Let ∼ ′ = N(P (∼ )). We have α∼ ′β iff ¬α ∨ ¬β ≤ ¬α iff ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) ∨
¬¬α∼ ¬(¬α∨¬β) iff α∼ α∧β, by Left Logical Equivalence, iff α∼ β, by And,
Right Weakening and Reflexivity.
Now, combining Proposition 9 and Lemma 12 we have the following theorem.
Theorem 13 If ∼ is a preferential inference relation, then the relation ≤
defined by (P ) is a weakly disjunctive partial entrenchment relation such that,
for all α, β in L,
α ∼ β iff α∼≤ β.
Proof. We must only show that ≤ is a weakly disjunctive partial entrenchment.
For Dominance, suppose that α ⊢ β. Thus ¬β ⊢ ¬α, and so ¬α ∨ ¬β ∼ ¬α.
Hence α ≤ β.
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For Transitivity, suppose that α ≤ β and β ≤ γ. By the definition above,
these translate to ¬α ∨ ¬β ∼ ¬α and ¬β ∨ ¬γ ∼ ¬β, respectively. Further, the
following rule is derivable in the preferential system P (Lemma 5.5 in [11])
α ∨ β ∼ α β ∨ γ ∼ γ
α ∨ β ∼ γ
.
So we have ¬α ∨ ¬γ ∼ ¬α. Hence α ≤ γ.
For Conjunction, suppose that γ ≤ α and γ ≤ β. We must show that γ ≤ α∧
β. Our assumption translates to ¬γ ∨¬α ∼ ¬γ and ¬γ ∨¬β ∼ ¬γ, respectively.
Applying Or and Left Logical Equivalence, we get ¬α ∨ ¬β ∨ ¬γ ∼ ¬γ. So
¬(α ∧ β) ∨ ¬γ ∼ ¬γ. Hence γ ≤ α ∧ β.
For Weak disjunction, suppose α → β ≤ ¬α and α → γ ≤ ¬α. These
translate to α∼ ¬β and α∼ ¬γ. By And, we have α∼ ¬β ∧ ¬γ. The latter
translates to α→ (β ∨ γ) ≤ ¬α as desired.
We can now give a bijective correspondence between the class of rational
nonmonotonic consequence relations and weakly disjunctive partial entrench-
ments. It is enough to translate the property of Rational Monotonicity using
P :
α ∨ ¬β 6≤ α α ∨ γ ≤ α
α ∨ β ∨ γ ≤ α ∨ β
(Splitting)
Weakly disjunctive relations satisfying Splitting will be called rational.
Corollary 14 If ∼ is a rational inference relation, then the relation ≤ defined
by (P ) is a rational weakly disjunctive partial entrenchment relation such that,
for all α, β in L,
α ∼ β iff α∼≤ β.
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